Informal sector trade in Uzbekistan by Kaiser, Markus
www.ssoar.info
Informal sector trade in Uzbekistan
Kaiser, Markus
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kaiser, M. (1997). Informal sector trade in Uzbekistan. (Working Paper / Universität Bielefeld, Fakultät für Soziologie,
Forschungsschwerpunkt Entwicklungssoziologie, 281). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, Fak. für Soziologie,
Forschungsschwerpunkt Entwicklungssoziologie. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-422831
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Universität Bielefeld University of Bielefeld
Fakultät für Soziologie Faculty of Sociology
Forschungsschwerpunkt Sociology of Development
Entwicklungssoziologie Research Centre
Universität Bielefeld - Postfach 100 131 - 33501 Bielefeld - Federal Republic of Germany - Tel.(0521)106-4650/4221
Fax (0521)106-2980
WORKING PAPER No  281
Informal Sector Trade in Uzbekistan
Markus Kaiser
Bielefeld 1997
ISSN 0936-3408
Informal Sector Trade in Uzbekistan1
1. THE RISE OF MARKETS IN UZBEKISTAN 2
1.1 Markets in Tashkent 3
1.2 Transition: From ‘second economy’ to Informal 4
1.2.1 The Hypodrom-Market 11
1.2.2 The Sozgorod-Market 13
2. EMIC AND DYNAMIC CONCEPTIONS OF THE PETTY-TRADERS 15
3. TYPES OF MARKET ACTORS 23
3.1 Proprietors 23
3.2 Realisators 26
3.3 Typical carrier path of and market actors in their context 28
4. INTEGRATION INTO THE SOCIETAL SYSTEM - EMBEDDEDNESS 34
4.1 Societal Embeddedness of Social Action 34
4.2 Transformed modes of action: strategic networks 42
CONCLUSIONS 46
BIBLIOGRAPHY 47
                                               
1 This paper was presented at the ‘Cities in Transition’ conference of RC 21 of the International Sociological
Association. It is a part of the project „Market, State, Ethnicity“; Sociology of Development Research Centre,
University of Bielefeld financed by the German Research Council. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Hans-Dieter
Evers, Prof. Dr. Solvay Gerke, Prof. Dr. Gudrun Lachenmann, Dr. Heiko Schrader, Prof. Dr. Endre Sik and
Prof. Dr. Claire Wallace for their constructive remarks and support. Even as the data was being collected and
in the first steps of the systematisation, Dr. Nuritdin I. Abdurakhmanov, Irina Yurkova, Oxana Karpenko,
Olga Otradinskaja, and Timur Shakirov facilitated the collecting of the database and its analysis through their
co-operation.
21. The Rise of Markets in Uzbekistan
In the Soviet types of social systems ‘everything’ was decided, according to current
literature, through one’s own position in the hierarchy or through having friends in high
positions; Money possessed no independent importance. (Shkaratan/ Radajev 1995). In
Marxist economic theory, the circulation of currency was considered unproductive. Since
the beginning of the politics of transformation in Uzbekistan, the economic capital has not
only gained in importance, but is becoming the determining element. The governmental
regulations regarding the commerce of imported merchandise in the USSR represented an
important element in the economic culture in the Soviet society. Since services did not
constitute any surplus value in the Marxist sense, this area was ignored and consequently
offered, and still offers, an enormous potential for development—on this all the international
agencies of privatisation agree. Prior to the start of Perestroika, the state executed almost
exclusive control over domestic and foreign trade of the goods most essential to the needs of
the population. Circumventing or breaking this monopoly led to prosecution and was
labelled ‘speculation’2 which was classified as a criminal act and classed with shadow
economy. In private households illicit work, illicit trade and corruption are particularly
interesting: Illicit work occurred mainly in the commercial service sector—especially in
skilled handiwork—and was closely intertwined with black marketeering, since the input
necessary for the execution of illegally performed services could almost only be acquired at
the black markets. These were well organised and functioned according to the classical
capitalistic law of supply and demand. Since the demand was constantly much greater than
the supply, the black market prices exceeded those prices that were fixed by the government
many times over.
                                               
2 Speculation was, according to Soviet criminal law, „one of the most dangerous economic crimes that attacks
the normal function of Soviet trading and the interests of the buyers. It consists in buying and selling goods
and other objects with the goal of making a profit. When speculation occurs, it is not important where and
from whom the goods were obtained (at a store or at the market, [etc.]), nor does it matter to whom they were
sold: to a government organisation, a kolkhoz, or an individual. Speculation is punishable with imprisonment
(up to 2 years) or a fine (up to 300 rubles). There is a steeper penalty (up to 7 years imprisonment with the
confiscation of one’s fortune) for speculation as an occupation or in large quantities“ (Book of criminal Law
of the RSFSR, § 154).
3There were no goods that were not available at the black markets (from basic food stuff and
replacement parts to fishing bait, medals and Christmas trees), but in addition there was
merchandise that was either not available through the official state redistributive system or
accessible only for certain people (domestic and imported luxury items, foreign currency,
domestic and foreign literature). The black market’s supply came from three sources:
Chiefly, they were goods of domestic production, from socialist organisations, and imported
goods (illicit distribution). In addition there was merchandise which was illegally produced
in small, capitalist family undertakings (illicit production). The fact that illicit production
and trade in connection with price speculation were not effectively combated despite a
special brigade of the militia3 is due to the great deal of bribery and corruption in
Uzbekistan. Emphasising the two different ways of Vergesellschaftung in Uzbekistan being
oriental and socialist modernised at the same time Olcott states the importance of
„strong familiy-based patronage networks which dominate the Party, the
government, and the official and the black-market economies“ (Eickelmann, Pasha
1991:636).
Hoffer accordingly follows that the stability in Central Asia lies in the existence of the
relatively stable clan system providing social coherence (1992:87, footnote 81).
1.1 Markets in Tashkent
Lying in the center of the city, the ‘Alayski-Bazar’ is of historical and supraregional
importance and is at the core a market for the agricultural products of the region. In Soviet
times it was the collective farm (kolkhoz) market in which the output of the permitted private
plots for growing produce and raising limited livestock was sold. Nowadays at the Alayski’
the newly (at least partly) privatised kolkhoz-farmers sell their privately produced food-stuff
and petty-producers sell their goods themselves in accordance with the free price agreement.
For the petty-traders, however, arised a new problem—the ‘local mafia’. A petty-trader
explained to me:
„For a long time now it has not been the case that the small farmer can sell his
products (diary products, vegetables, meat, etc.) at the ‘Alayski’ in peace. Usually,
he is forced by the local mafia to pay ‘stand-fees’ or he gets the offer to sell his
goods in bulk to a middlemen“ (Leila, 27, Uzbek).
                                               
3 The Department for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation (OBKhSS).
4The city Tashkent is, due to its geographical situation in the center of the richly populated
part of Central Asia and due to the international airport it has become a place of
transhipment of supra-regional importance for imported goods. Opportunities to purchase
imported goods in Tashkent can be broken down into groups: government-run stores, co-
operative trade, private individual trade and the kiosk markets. In Tashkent, in addition, two
open-air import markets have been established: The Hypodrom-Market and the Sozgorod-
Market. Both markets are establishments of the 90s and are the access to free ‘trade for the
masses’ (Slovo 1995).4 In what follows after the brief description of the historical
development these two markets will be introduced and described.
1.2 Transition: From ‘second economy’ to Informal
It is said that one could, even in Soviet times, buy everything at the ‘tolchoki’ (markets).
These markets, where a lively hustle and bustle prevailed, were not organised rather they
usually spontaneously arose and stayed alive till their closure by state organs. The existence
of a black market means that a variety of markets existed in the Soviet Union at which
market behaviour was practised.5 The actor could participate here as a producer of goods, as
someone who offers services and, of course, as a buyer. The state tolerated this and in some
way even demanded it to be so.6
In Uzbekistan there was a market without a market place where one could buy imported
goods for five to six times the purchase price. There were goods sold there that were
imported (or smuggled) in small quantities by those who, by belonging to the political and
cultural elite (athletes, seamen, employees of international tourist agencies), could travel in
to non-COMECON territory. After the market was closed, the ‘Morjatshiki’, the sailors’
wives, went from one undertaking to the next, offering the goods their husbands brought
                                               
4 Slovo (1995) hinted at the possibilities of joint ventures through a very few have access to ‘free trade’.
5 Sufficiently discussed under the concept ‘second economy’.
6 Dr. Nuritdin I. Abdurakhmanov reported that the restrictions against the black market in the individual
Soviet republics varied. The ‘Soviet Republic of Corruption’ (Uzbekistan) was very relaxed in its prosecution
of black traders, and he estimated a turnover of about 15 to 20% of total turnover on merchandise. It was
excused by the oriental traditions of basars and trading routes (Silk Road, Gold Road).
5back from abroad for sale. This harboured a very high risk since one always had to reckon
with encountering a ‘warrior against speculation’.7
There was also a state-run net of stores that dealt (Beriozka) in imported merchandise,
though only for people who had access to foreign currency. Those to whom these businesses
were inaccessible could purchase these goods ‘under the table’ from the ‘Morjatshiki’ at
completely inflated prices but payable in roubles. The well-known scarcity in the consumer
goods sector can be best characterised by the following joke: A woman goes into a fish store
and asks if there is any meat. The fish-seller replies: Here there is no fish, if you want no
meat you’ll have to go next door. Yet the emptier the stores were, the more adventurous and
refined the methods and circumventing became in order to get the desired piece of meat or
any other deficit product. It becomes more and more important with the increasing scarcity
of all kinds of consumer items in the stores to have friends and acquaintances. Without
‘vitamin C’—C for connections—one often got nowhere.
During the years of stagnation (Brezhnev) the consumer demand was increasingly satiated
through the ‘second economy’8—due to the shortages of goods in the official sector. Only
one fifth of the respondents9 affirmed that they had already begun business activities in the
‘second economy.’ This shows that from an actors oriented approach the ‘second economy’
not simply shifted to the informal sector of the newly applied market economy.10 However,
even among the traders with black market experience there was generally a change in their
concrete business activities providing further evidence.
„I was engaged in commerce even here—before I started traveling, but it was not
very interesting. My uncle lives in Tshimkent. I went to see him, to his warehouse
and took the goods, brought them here and realised them through the commercial
businesses on the Darkham. It wasn’t hard to do and gave me some money for my
personal expenses.“ (Nargisa, 25, Uzbek).
                                               
7 Official name of the department for economic crime within the militia.
8 The concept ‘second economy’ was defined by Grossmann (1977) to include any activity that is conducted
for private gain.
9 They were asked about trading prior to 1991. In total there were 386 interviews with traders, of which 300
were standardised questionnaires administrated by TADQIQOT agency and 86 were semi-structured
interviews. One has to consider the dramatic increase of trading activities (cf. Kaiser 1997b).
10 From a more institutional oriented approach this shift is convincingly argued by Sik (1994) and Leitzel
(1995).
6More and more goods were ‘put into private ownership’ and ‘sold under the table’ or ‘next
to the factory’ so that, again, there were campaigns against the undermining of the
communist economic system. Petty-traders were, thus, also perceived as usurers and as
greedy for profit. The press depicted them as parasites and vermin (Slovo 1995). But, for
most of them it was a strategy for survival or for improving their standard of living. One
trader stated:
„That was 1987. In order to be independent of my parents and their decisions as to
whether to give me money or not, I decided to earn a little money for myself. I went
to technical college with a guy who was already a ‘pro’ in this area, and he imparted
his experience to me. I borrowed 2000 roubles from my parents, but promised to
pay it all back.“ (Slava, 30, Russian).
Every petty-trader maintained in unison that starting capital and access to trade by means of
some initial business tips are the first hurdles to be taken. Thus, it seemed likely that those
who were already active in black market activity in Soviet times had an advantage.
„I drove to Uratjube in Tajikistan. At that time there was a government-run market
place where people met who called themselves ‘purchasers’. That is to say, they
could get something out of the commercial warehouses of those days. One brought
all these goods home and had to get to know someone in order to get information on
the goods that others were interested in.
That business went together with the fact that there are goldmines near Uratjube.
And, like they used to say back then, ‘Moscow’s supply’ was there—and that was
the absolute truth. There were top-quality groceries and consumer goods there. The
first person I met explained to me who meets where. There was a row of shoemaker
workshops where two to three petty-traders also sat. I went through the row and
asked them what there was and how much it costed. When I wanted something, we
drove in their car to their house. This is the way I travelled for two years—as long
as I was in college.“ (Slava, 30, Russian).
Slava’s business activities belong to the area of ‘illicit (black) distribution’, and he explained
that when the opportunity was over, the tacit agreements and networks fell apart. The arising
of opportunities and setting-up of black distribution channels was consequentially situation-
dependent. Characteristic of that time, as Slava says, was a rather social environment or
milieu „that was ready to try out any latent possibilities“.
Valia (43, Russian) explained that there was an internal mental separation from the Soviet
system which had a specific trust building character within face-to-face relations in every
day life. They were all a community of fate. The increasing economic decline executed
stronger ties within the communities, for example if someone out of your neighbourhood did
7not receive any pay anymore despite working in a factory we helped each other out. Thus,
she already in 1984 foresaw the coming economic crisis:
„I somehow foresaw all that because people began to go from one form of payment
to another (in goods or natural produce, for example). I thought something is not
right. I worked and met with directors and saw how they all stole back then. [...]
I worked on the gas line ‘Urengoy-Pomari-Ushgorod’ where the Soviet regime
drowned in its own policies. The entire Soviet Union worked for this gas line, and
the top administrators there stole everything from spoons to underwear. Of course,
no one could prove it because we were on the spot of construction. And if a
helicopter were to fly out there it could be stuck out there if the weather was bad;
and there were gas explosions... Everyone was scared and no one wanted to fly out
there. And we wrote off everything: rugs, blankets, TVs and our boss signed it. He
himself sent a helicopter full of goods back home. He drove a car, turned it around
and sank it in a river. And everything that was or wasn’t in this car was written off.
And who is going to dive into the river to check it out? All that then went to
Ukraine and Tatarstan, where all these rugs and furniture stand to this day“ (Valia,
43, Russian).
The teamwork by the directors, bookkeepers and workers described by Valia, even if it just
meant keeping quiet, operated according to the principle „you can’t get something for
nothing.“ This popular maxim captures the logic behind the (non) monetary fee that was
omnipresent—especially in party and administrative systems and was determined relative to
one’s requested service.
„Even back then in 1988 I thought: that’s not going to last very long—that’s not a
bottomless barrel. And I decided to go into commerce. At that time I lived in
Bashkiria. I went to the Aeroflot ticket office and asked what destinations tickets
were available for. I was told: none to Riga, none to Tallin, but there were still some
to Tashkent. Did I want to go there? So I went to Tashkent and started to bring
various goods from here: knitted goods, towels etc.
Then, by coincidence, I got to know a woman in the train who said to me: Why do
you torture yourself with these heavy bags. That’s so heavy (sometimes I had eight
bags with me) bring furniture instead! At that time I already had a chance to buy
furniture. I bought and delivereed two containers. I co-operated with an other
woman because I was scared to travel alone. We traveled in groups of three or four
and bought the furniture for 11,000 roubles; a car costed 4,000 roubles back then. I
distributed this furniture throughout the entire Soviet Union—Sotshi, Nabereshnige
Tshelni, Krasnojarsk. I have friends everywhere; my girl friend said to me: send us
furniture and we’ll sell it. Back then half of the Soviet Union’s furniture came from
Tashkent. Imagine that, 150 containers were sent to Nabereshnije Tshelni—a city
with 150,000 inhabitants.
What’s wrong? Railroad officials got aggravated and turned to a managing clerk.
Then we broke off the business because the managing clerk took an interest in me.
8In Soviet times that was called ‘speculation in large magnitudes’. But I didn’t send
anything to my own address so they couldn’t do anything to me. I said: Yeah, I did
that, but they can’t prove it, because they would have had to arrest me in the act of
selling“ (Liuda, 57, Russian).
In the ‘second economy’ those who had the opportunity undertook business deals where by
any means a bargain could be made. Some had constant opportunity, however they
remained part-time traders with at-least an official job in the ‘First Economy’—the
government control against fronts alone made this necessary. Discretion was of utmost
importance and the goods were shoved through the network from the trader all the way to
the consumer and were often exchanged. The exchange of goods dominated since the
distributor was only very seldom interested in monetary payment—rather he wanted much
more to receive some merchandise as compensation that he himself or a friend urgently
needed. Social capital was of greater importance than economic capital. The situation today
is different, and since then nothing more can be done without ‘vitamin M’—M for money.
The stores are fuller, and at the markets there are goods imported from the West. If the
dining table remains empty, then it is not due to lacking connections but because the money
is lacking.
In classical economic literature market is portrayed as a form of encounter that can be, in
principle, managed by an individual in the open setting of anonymity (cf. Gretschmann
1984:118). In market relationships the economic communication becomes indifferent to
personal acquaintances, and those relationships inherent to the ‘second economy’ and to
household needs are replaced, so far the economists.
The Perestroika phase is the time of the beginning economic transition in which dealing with
goods was legalised. Every respondent emphasised the changes in their living conditions in
this period. Representative of them all, a petty-trader said:
„Under the communist regime we did not live poorly. Like other people: work,
education—everything was stable. The intelligentsia was not at all adapted to the life
that began with the Perestroika years. We worked in a government-run organization
and were exposed to such poverty that we did not even have enough money for bread.
We went to my grandpa who is a pensioner and receives his pension unfailingly. And
in our case there was always hesitation to pay wages or the pay was very little“ (Sveta,
40, Russian).
The time of Perestroika can be devided into two periods which correspond to the genesis
and variation of new possibilities of economic activity. These periods are distinguished from
9one another by political events and legal decisions which affected the development of the
economic system of the USSR. Even the models of small-scale trading varied with these
periods.
The beginning phase lasted from 1987 to 1991. For this period the development of
behaviour according to the ‘farzovka-model’ is characteristic. The ‘farzovka-model’ is
connected both with the buying and selling of goods that were brought into the USSR by
tarrying foreigners and those in exile and with the related speculation. The so-called
‘farzovshtshiki’ were essentially young people up to 25 years old. For this time period and
this age group, an increase in the importance of western popular culture can be observed. In
demand were essentially music, clothes (like jeans) and products. Fierman writes:
„Young people throughout the USSR realize that consumer goods produced in the
West are generally of superior quality and therefore they strive to obtain them“
(Fierman 1988:12).
Already in 1984, the ‘Komsomolets Uzbekistana’ noted that the domestic production clearly
traces the expectations and demands of the young people. The admiring of and demand for
Western products, consequently, did not only come about with the opening of the markets,
rather a generation got better access to consumption and a lifestyle they already were
striving after which, however, was robbed of its oppositional character in the process. The
causes of this conversion must be sought after much more in the internal developments.
Those are not only characterised by a model of capitalist economic commerce, but also by
the formation of a specific cultural environment.
The following period from 1991 to 1992 brought far-reaching opportunities since travel
conditions and the regulations for the importing of goods were relaxed. The ‘tchelnotshnyj
model’ (shuttel trading) is characterised by regular trips over the border with the purpose of
trading. For the second period the export of merchandise out of Uzbekistan and the import
of foreign currency into Uzbekistan is characteristic. The foreign currency was exchanged
into roubles, the goods were purchased and everything was repeated according to the same
scenario. Many petty-traders (‘tchelnoki’) with professional experience reminisce on these
times with feelings of nostalgia.
„The Gorbatshev years were the best years. Back then one could do business
without owning anything. Now, one needs starting capital to pay the travel costs, to
get to the goods and to secure oneself a place at the market. Back then complete
10
chaos prevailed. The big guys tried to clarify something while we just did business“
(Fatkhulla, 34, father Tajik, mother Uzbek, 2nd interview).
This period can be seen as the apex of the possibilities for petty-traders’ economic activity
due to the profitability of this commerce and the lack of any laws regarding it. The decontrol
of the price of commodities (from 1 Jan 1992 onwards) and the change in the political and
economic situation in Uzbekistan and in the chosen partner countries forced the ‘tchelnoki’
to change their model of behaviour. Now they drive with foreign currency to Turkey, China,
Poland, etc. and bring back merchandise to sell.
The most common model of commerce of this time was the participation in ‘shopping-tours’
through specialised agents. For this, groups of people who generally did not know each
other were put together in buses. The wish to buy low and sell high was all that bound them
together. In Karakalpakstan, for example, the form of mutual crediting (between private
persons), for business tours is generally spread. Such credits have been given against up to 30%
interest per month. The small-scale shuttle trading is feminised. In Urgench it was witnessed:
„On trains there are 80 women among 100 passengers involved in the shuttle
business“ (Gulchekhra, 59, Uzbek).
To sum it up, the possibility of practising commerce according to the ‘tchelnoki model’ was
established for the first time in the 90s. Since then, even the highway of commerce has
turned around. In the 80s goods from the USSR were sold—even abroad—but now goods
are bought in the USSR and foreign currency is brought out. The initial sale of goods in
countries with higher prices served to build capital which was then reinvested in imported
goods and brought the spiral of commerce into gear.
Meanwhile Uzbekistan gained independence. The Uzbek government gave out trading
licenses in order to provide consumer goods to overcome shortages due to the rapid decline
of the national production. The Sum11-profits that the petty-traders earned in Uzbekistan
could be exchanged for foreign currency up until 1 Jan. 1997 when the government got rid
liquidity to combat inflation. Resourceful petty-traders, mainly from Afghanistan and
Pakistan, legally imported goods to Uzbekistan and then smuggled them to Kazakhstan
                                               
11 National currency of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
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where the duties are higher. They then converted the Tenge12 they made in Kazakhstan
freely (i.e., at the market) into dollars. At the black market for foreign currency back in
Uzbekistan, they got Usbek Sum for the dollars. To finish their transaction, they presented
these Sum-profits to the Uzbek national bank and received dollars at the official exchange
rate because the trading licenses entitled them to do so. The discrepancy between the official
and free-market exchange rates alone secured the traders a profit of over 50%. Since the
Uzbek government held the trading licenses responsible for the deficit in the trade balance,
the foreign currency exchange allowance was restricted again.
In this phase the ‘Chorsu-Market’ in Tashkent developed into a large site for the commerce
and transhipment of goods. 13 In the beginning there was little control and large profit
margins could be achieved.
„For example, we sold a radio with a forged receipt for far more that its worth.
Originally the radio was purchased for 100 US$ but was displayed with a receipt for
over 300 US$ so that the deal was realised for 315 US$. You have to understand
that there is a law that regulates the maximum surcharge in relation to the purchase
price. Bribery helps here quite well, if there should ever be problems“ (Sasha, 40,
Ukrainian).
The legally fixed trade margin is an indication of the administration’s sticking to its opinion
that trade is dishonest usury. However, it appears to be necessary—due to the
uninformedness and reservedness of the consumers that cannot just be explained by pointed
to the lacking purchasing power—to protect the consumers. The special expansion of the
market and the relative uncontrolableness of the ‘Chorsu’ that fades into the surrounding
maze of streets was cause for the city administration of Tashkent to forbid the marketing of
non-agricultural goods and to expel the Hypodrom to the marketplace.
1.2.1 The Hypodrom-Market
The Hypodrom-Market is a wholesale market that tranships a huge amount of goods and at
which there are transactions for high sums of money (as one of my respondents claimed,
$10,000 to $100,000). Among the inhabitants of Tashkent there is a widely held opinion of
the market as a breeding place for criminal activity and a camp for mafia rackets. But
despite their misgivings most of the inhabitants with a modest or small income use this
                                               
12 National currency of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
13 The ‘Chorsu’ is a square in the inner circle of Tashkent.
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market from time to time to buy goods cheaply in comparison to the low quality local stores
in the city. The same goods are available through middlemen for a surcharge at the various
kiosks and likewise at the improvised markets in the city that are not intended for that.
The Hypodrom-market is 15 km outside of Tashkent. This open-air market is open every day
and petty-traders and shopkeepers can reach the Hypodrom-market with city-buses, private
buses and taxis if they do not have access to private cars. The market place is an area
surrounded by a barbed wire fence that one can enter for an admission fee—the fee was
introduced by the market administration set into power by the administration of the city of
Tashkent.
The market is divided into independent zones according to types of goods, says the market
director. He lists: The market for autos, the market for replacement parts, commodities
market, food stuff market, whole sale market. The actual market consists of parallel streets
lined with metal kiosks and stands and on different streets different goods are offered
showing the beginning of specialisation and market differentiation. There is a street for
leather goods, one for carpets, one for fabric, one for clothes and one corner for mass
products from China and Southeast Asia—just to name the major ones. Everything can be
sold, so there are also cigarettes, alcohol, candy and durable food in industrial sizes. Here,
resellers from all over Uzbekistan stock up on goods that they then sell at local markets for a
surcharge. Even in remote regions the origins of merchandise was often reported to be the
Hypodrom-market in Tashkent. It is the whole sale market (opti) for petty-traders with a
huge amount of merchandise.
The commodities market is divided into the Korean market and the Chinese market, as the
Tashkentians call them. At the Korean market goods of relatively high quality are sold that
came from Europe, South Korea and Japan. The market is called thus because the Korean
petty-traders are concentrated here. 22 % declared to be of Korean descent, i.e. to have at
least one parent who was a Korean, compared to only 4 to 5 % of Tashkent´s population.
The Chinese market is a place sell goods from China, Iran and Turkey. The sale results here
through persons
„of local nationalities and through Uigurs“ (Dr. Jumaev, National Academy for the
Construction of Society).
13
However, no one admitted to me—or to local co-workers—to come from China. However,
one could not help but notice the Chinese goods, and Chinese traders probably employ
realisators since they can better avoid the organs of control. This is an advantage since
relations between the Central Asian states and China are problematic—due to the Uigurian
minorities that strive more and more for independence, for variety in politico-economic
bases, and the at least semi-closed borders. It is also conceivable that the regions bordering
on Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and the markets in these three adjoining states build a
buffer zone (c. Wallace 1997) connecting Asian markets with Russia and Eastern Europe.
The merchandise is then sold there to a middlemen and thus its ethnicity changes and is sold
by these men or women somewhere else. The traders dilemma described by Evers and
Schrader (1994) and a rise in the travel and boarding costs with the distance and lengths of
the trips, along with Visa and residency-restrictions, would be circumvented.
1.2.2 The Sozgorod-Market
The Sozgorod-market is in the Southwest outskirts of Tashkent. Tram and trolly stops are
just a five to ten minute walk away. The Sozgorod market consists of the actual market
place, a parking lot, some containers that surf at work shops and storage rooms, an
administration building and the lively daods for pedestrians and cars that pass by the snack
stands and empty into three entrances. The entrances hardly allow the newcomers and those
who want to leave the market to pass through. But this makes it possible for the militia and
market organisers to regulate the goings-on and guarantee safety. That is a pre-requisite for
buyers and sellers to meet.
The actual market can be essentially divided into three parts. (1) The market for permanent
traders who have either rented or purchased a kiosk or market stand. There, mainly
cosmetics, clothing, shoes and imported food is offered. (2) The south and (3) east sections
of the market are frequented much more by occasional traders and realisators who present
their goods impromptu; where goods are hung from wash lines and displayed on sheets,
tables, table clothes, bathmats and even cots. And even here in these flea market ensembles
there are taxes and fees to pay.
The market was founded in May 1994. Before, there was a auto repair centre and parking at
this site. A good part of the petty-traders are discharged officers from the contingent of
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armed forces. The market was set up within one month. In the newspapers weekly
advertisements were run, but not in a sufficient measure because on opening day only 100
petty-traders showed up. Presently, according to the market director, 2,000 petty-traders can
be found at the market daily. Sometime soon, the site is expected to be expanded to twice its
present size, since the demand for commercial space keeps growing.
„When this market was opened there were already several similar markets, but they
weren’t well organised so that there was a lot of stealing and drug dealing going on.
Therefore, we decided to start this market with safety as a first priority. We wanted
both the buyers and the sellers to be satisfied. None of this was done from experts
but by newcomers. None of us had done anything like this before. The owner of the
market is a doctor, and I [the director] am an engineer. This is completely new to
us—but maybe it worked out because it’s our friends who are working here“
(Aikhanum, 44, Uzbek).
Security is the central element for this trading site. The market place and the exchange of
goods require this security as a constitutive element since the uneasiness of the consumers
with respect to petty-traders and ‘usurers’ must first be conquered. Security, thus, plainly
makes the consumers more accepting.
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2. Emic and Dynamic Conceptions of the Petty-Traders
Each milieu calls for its own organising methods taking the experiences and the specific
realities of the actors into account. The new economic actors in their social setting have
developed their own conceptions. Opportunity structures or favourable market conditions
are universal factors, that is for all businesses. The socialist societies themselves offered
social variables and cultural ones to business which are gradually overcome by the new
economic actors.
Becoming a trader they remain for longer periods of time in the social setting of the market.
Those who feel that they belong to the market declared that they were there from early
morning to late in the evening, so that it has become a full-time occupation for a large
portion of the petty-traders and realisators.
According to my data the number of entrepreneurs have gradually increased during the last
years. Attitudes towards them from the respondents, however, differ. Raiya (38, Uzbek) said
that they had a family in their makhallah who was involved in commerce and who were very
rich. But they were holding separately from the rest so they are not very respected by their
neighbours. Extrapolating this case it seems necessary to accumulate money or wealth and
to stay more distant to others and eventually to deny contributions to the community.14 In
general there is suspicion for those who are involved in trade. This are the old Soviet
prejudices when they were considered as potential criminals possessed with money.
„Before it was characterised as speculation, but today it is business“ (Fatkhulla, 35,
Uzbek).
The legalisation of private trade by legislation at the national level did not legalise the
trading in the minds of the people, and to this day ‘trading’, for a part of the population,
means to do something dishonest and shameful.
„Second-hand traders, bourgeois, exploiters—that is bad, that is an insult“
(Fatkhulla, 35, Uzbek).
                                               
14 It means keeping back from the system of mutual aid which is developed among relatives and neighbours.
Help, besides participation in organisation of kin-family measures, is provided in building of houses, in the
case of misfortune or pecuniary embarrassment, in cultivation of land and harvesting. More often, such aid is
rendering free of charge or for symbolic payment.
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„Trading“ means „not working“ (Kan, 36, Korean).
„That is a temporary appearance, until everything is finally available in the stores
for acceptable prices. That dies off all by itself. People have to work and not be
busy with such things“ (Svetlana, 60, Russian).
For the petty-traders at the market themselves, it means ‘survival’, and I received the
following justifying answer:
„But I hate this bazaar. I only do it to survive, for the money. It is after all
impossible to live if you don’t have any datcha or don’t run a business. Look, 60%
of the people at the market belong to the intelligentsia. With the wages they earn,
one just cannot live.“ (Fatkhulla, 35, Uzbek).
„I still cannot be happy about it. Why? Yeah, why aren’t the teachers and engineers
pleased? Because they have to do it and for no other reason. ‘But to enjoy doing
something that one is forced to do is very difficult. I would like to practice what I
studied, but now I can’t. This market ruined us. I want to save some money as long
as that isn’t objected to, so that I have something that I can live off of. And then
we’ll see“ (Sasha, 40, Ukrainian).
In Soviet times the importance of money was ideologically degraded. The ‘tolchok’ as a
place for the realisation of purely economic interests was the criticism that the parents of the
respondents gave. The unfamiliar (and not too long ago, criminal) activity was seen as an
undesirable occupation for the children.
„It was very painful to my parents that I fell into trading. That is the communist
upbringing. A Scrooge is bad, an insult. They were terribly scared. They are, after
all, ‘Soviets’. My father is a Stalinist until 1980 he wore the Lenin-Stalin medal. My
mother is more progressive, but even she has told me again and again, all that I am
risking. They tried to turn me away from it, asked about my workbook, said its all
fine and good, but later... There was a lot of arguing about this topic. My sister and
I are on one side and they are on the other. But when I brought home the first
paycheck, they stopped insisting that I return to the factory“ (Fatkhulla, 35, Uzbek).
„My parents were absolutely against it, but since then they have completely
changed their minds. Sometimes, they even help out, when we can’t do it all alone.
My parents still belong to the old school. They believe: where a man works, he
should always were. The worked 35 years in the same place and that’s good. But
now such stability is impossible. Yeah, and they see our colleagues who stayed in
the jobs and now have it very tough. My wife is a nurse. She didn’t work long, for
three months they didn’t get paid“ (Stephan, 35, Armenian).
For the generations that were born in the 60’s and 70’s, the problems of adapting to the
market cannot be attributed as much to the ideological borders but rather to the lack of
experience and connections that were indispensable for a successful business venture. They
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learned in the course of their business, and they partially decide against their cultural capital
that they acquired in the past.
“Certainly, some parts of the population (mainly young people) live after the
socialist period, because they were born already beyond all that, which was
happening with us. They do not remember it as we do. That previous generation
was rejected by this new one. Though, very many people still proceed to live with
their former memory, former customs, moral principles... They proceed to live in
socialism” (Svetlana Aleksievich, 60, Russian).
It seems that the above presented point of view is a very exact and capacious description of
the intellectual and psychological state of being and thinking of the citizens of the former
USSR.15
Money and material goods were said to be the most convincing arguments when they
confronted their parents or peers with the new working and living arrangements. Another
important reported aspect why the parents respectively the fathers agreed was, due to the
markets location in bigger towns. Trading in the city did not bring shame upon their family
since the neighbours in the village do not necessarily have to be informed. Only one woman
reported that her father was very proud when she told him that she started trading.
„He was telling everybody in the makhallah that his daughter is working now and
earning money. He did not care what the others said“ (Olga, 23, Russian).
The attitude towards money is constantly changing and a business discourse appears.
Many petty-traders rate their activity disparging and defend their presence at the market by
appealing to the fact that they have to survive under the hard economic conditions. But the
thought that the petty-traders take it upon themselves to do what the state and notable
enterprises cannot manage is a cause for optimism.
„Of course the people come here and don’t go to the stores—There is the same stuff
here only much cheaper. It’s a good deal to shop at the market. In the stores there is
the same merchandise, but it is two to three times as expensive. This state of affairs
                                               
15 Obviously, the decades of mutual living in one country, even one as big as the USSR, could not but
influence formation of the same type of mentality, world perception, mode of life. It marks out to researchers
some clear characteristics, stereotypes inherent to an equal extent for inhabitants of the Far East, as well as for
Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Armenians etc. At the same time, it is obvious that each region has its specific
peculiarities, which make it different from others.
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expresses a way of life. People simply help one another where the state pays no
attention“ (Stephan, 35, Armenian).
On the other hand there is widely spread the opinion that retail sellers are very close to
Mafia circles and have to take the dirty deals as they do not have any choice which in turn
corrupt their good image. Additionally, the prices on markets are perceived as being unfair
by 69,2% of the respondents in the all Uzbekistan survey.
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Interestingly enough is that those who think that the prices are fair are more willing to
conduct trading as income raising activity. On the other hand, as the table shows, those who
perceive the prices as being unfair are not likely to become a trader. Assuming that the
perception of the prices being unfair reflects somehow Soviet mentality it shows the high
degree of interlinkage between the perception of markets and ongoing changing economic
behaviour in the process of transformation. More astonishing was that the perception of
prices of imported merchandise and local products differ hardly.16
However, despite this overlap attitudes to the entrepreneurial producers especially to
craftsmen are in comparison quit opposite. Shakhnazar (41, Uzbek) giving an example said
that in their settlement where a craftsmen lived who made ceramic pottery there were queues
                                               
16 As 69,2% perceive imported merchandise unfairly priced, an even slightly higher amount of citizens of
Uzbekistan, namely 71,4%, view locally produced goods as unfairly priced. Local co-workers explained this
by noting that the information on prices abroad and the fair profit is more limited, but they feel the price
increases on locally produced and grown groceries as unfair. The data on a later stage has to compare price
perceptions of real consumers and of those who can’t afford it and their admirations (Kaiser 1997a).
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of customers who wished to buy his products. In addition, school children were coming to
take lessons from him and to master a technique of his art. He continued telling that he
personally asked him „to teach my son pottery craft“.
In contra-distinction to the Hypodrom-market where a large number of visitors from other
cities in Uzbekistan and from other republics of the CIS do business (from Russia, e.g.), at
the Sozgorod-market only the inhabitants of Tashkent are to be found. The exclusive right of
the Tashkentians to do business at the site is not formally fixed nor is it claimed to be. Every
person who comes to the market and fills out the proper papers, has the right to run a
business there according to the vice-director. The small-scale and location of the market are
not practical for petty-traders from other regions. What Fatkhulla one day claimed:
„No one unfamiliar to us can come here“ (Fatkhulla, 35, Uzbek).
turned out to be false; every petty-trader has access to the opportunities offered by the
market according to his financial abilities and willingness. The bazarkom (market director
appointed by the state authorities) of the market rents out or sells the retail space to the
proprietors of stalls and merchandise who then either sell their themselves or hire
realisators.
These markets, where a lively hustle and bustle prevailed, were not organised rather they
usually spontaneously arose. The times have changed since then, and my observations show
that the everyday use of the word ‘tolchok’, too, has changed. The word ‘tolchok’ cannot be
directly translated; nor is there an unambiguous understand of the etymology of this word.
Its meaning comes from the verb ‘tolkat’ (to push). In addition to the literal meaning there
was in Soviet times a second meaning in slang: to sell outside of the net of trade, from hand
to hand (in the sense of ‘to shove’). It were not only commodities markets that were called
‘tolchok’; the food stuff markets were, too. Though at the farmer markets trading in the
traditional sense was meant, i.e. that does not take place over the net but rather from hand to
hand. As a synonym the conjunction promtovarnyj rynok (commodities market) was used,
which is in fact its official expression. Nowadays the concept ‘tolchok’ was used exclusively
to denote the imported commodities markets.
This distinguishes the ‘tolchok’ from every formal bureaucratic organisation that relies on
standardization and strict control through registration. A row of moral conditions are unique
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to informal relationships: trust, friendship, reliability. The intrusion of these concepts
impedes the organisation as one hand, on the other a unique value system seems to be.
With the help of a well organised security system, the market administration represents the
state. It not only has control over the market property but also over the bordering territory.
In this manner the market administration makes itself a partner whom one can trust and who
can offer protection against various mafia and criminal groups. The petty-traders rated the
measure of security thus:
„In the beginning there were problems: the mafia, extortioners and the tax office.
Sometimes one had to pay, but some things were just fixed from the beginning.
Around here they say ‘have 100 roubles and have 100 friends’.17 Now it’s become
more peaceful, safer. At the market all that stuff is gone“ (Stephan, 35, Armenian).
„Extortioners? No, there aren’t any here. There was a time when those guys showed
up, but they were told right away how things are here“ (Fatkhulla, 35, Uzbek).
„As long as the market is here I am protected. If something happens I get help, but
when they set out to really tackle the matter, then not even connections can help
anymore“ (Asylbek, 26, Uzbek).
Symbols of security and order are in the high, re-inforced concrete wall around the ‘tolchok’
and the ten meter high watchtower. In addition there are people with cellular phones and the
militia both in uniform and in civilian clothes.
I noticed that the petty-traders and realisators belonged to various age groups. Among the
full-time traders, most fell into the 25-40 years old age group—and it should be noted that
age was a criterion, albeit a weak one, of inclusion and exclusion. Casual traders are very
often retired and are at the markets to supplement their pensions. They mostly work as
realisators where they can help younger family members and acquaintances run their
businesses. The reason seems to me to be that being a trader includes and cultivates a
lifestyle that was more attractive to younger people: it requires travel and being „tough“. In
addition, this age group grew up during the years of stagnation (Brehznev) and much more
heavily refused to accept the socialist values and conceptions.
Nevertheless, entrepreneurial values and attitudes have been developed. Like consumer life-
style it seems that also business life-stile is an at times desperate try for the maintenance of
                                               
17 „Ne imei sto rublei, a imei sto druzei“. ‘Better to have a hundred friends than a hundred roubles’ used to
be original proverb.
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the self in a world of up-breaking social ties and economic relations. Even rural towns are
nowadays full of young ‘businessmeny’18 who own nothing more than the suit they wear
and a self designed business card. Life-styling is not necessarily a sign of economic well-
being but „an aspect of a more general strategy for the establishment or maintenance of the
self“ (Evers/ Gerke 1997:13).19
Striking is how the change in the petty-trader’s reading habits towards a certain form of
publication—advertisements took place. Those petty-traders who were asked admitted to
reading the ads where everything one could want to buy is for sale. In this way, our co-
operative of food traders got information about the broker’s/ middlemen’s (‘melki optovi’)
prices, but also for the prices of used cars. Others searched for people who would buy their
clothing on a commission basis or in a direct sale.
Similar to observing their reading habits, what petty-traders watch and listen can also make
clear that there has been a change. Very popular are the books ‘Be a winner in Business’,
‘How to make 1 Million US$ a Year’, or ‘English for businessmen’. Thus, informative
stations are preferred that regularly report about the dollar’s current exchange rate in
Uzbekistan’s various private banks—this is especially important for clothing traders.
In Uzbekistan, like in the other new independent states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, the co-operation with a bank is not considered ‘normal’ or ‘usual’. The only bank
that the Soviet citizens set foot in as a rule was the Sberbank in order to (e.g.) pay their
telephone bill, collect pension, etc. Dealing with other banks through which the state
handled investments in industry, development, etc., remained reserved for those who (e.g.)
worked in the planning department of the collective combine. To deal with these banks in
Soviet times, permission was necessary—just to get past the guards, so that the concept
‘bank’ was always associated with control. These reservations are essentially responsible for
the petty-traders’ preference for borrowing money from other petty-traders, acquaintances,
friends and relatives.
                                               
18 As other terms businessmen was successfully added to Russian language.
19 Initiated by Bourdieu’s ‘Distinction’ (1982/1979) research on life-styles and consumption as expressions of
social distinction has developed, even if economic resources restrict it to symbolic consumption (Gerke
1997).
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A closing interview with the market director suggested a pertinent change in the trend—that
the marketing management wants to expand the market place and modernise by roofing it in,
all financed through a European development agency.
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3. Types of Market Actors
On the one hand, a new type of employer has been arising, on the other, a mass of people
who either are active in the governmental structure or belong to informal groups like the
mafia or racketeers to control market activities arised. In what follows I will introduce the
two categorial types of new economic actors who assembled different networks and
developed various systems of solidarity and whose market strategies have differed with
respect to the posessory interests of the goods to be sold. In this the proprietors stand in
contrast to the realisators.
3.1 Proprietors
The concept proprietor is used both by proprietors themselves and by the realisators and the
customers when they talk to the sellers. The proprietor possesses goods and/ or a stand at the
market, and depending on his financial situation he has the freedom to decide whether he
himself will trade the goods at the market or hire a realisator. For all proprietors, it was
characteristic to strive to administrate and control a business, to control the stream of goods,
to invest the money and have no immediate connection to the sale.
The variety of merchandise dictates the strategy of purchasing and reselling it. Two main
types can be distinguished: Petty-traders who deal in clothing and cosmetics compete with
wholesale suppliers of the quasi-governmental ex- and import organisations and
nevertheless try to proceed in accordance with the ‘tshelnotshnyj’ model (Stephan, 35,
Armenian) , i.e., they import by themselves. For the owners of grocery kiosks it is presently
very useful—due to the amount of goods imported by the wholesalers—to take advantage of
the wholesale suppliers in the city and to buy from them since they can no longer achieve
the order of magnitude necessary to compete (Fatkhulla, 35, Uzbek). One of the largest
importers is the Usbek-Turkish firm ‘Nur Efsan’ whose director Mustafa Güler, an
immigrant from Turkey to Uzbekistan, claimed to receive 30-40 truck-loads every week
from Turkey.
The clothes and hygiene products that are sold at the Sozgorod-market are either bought at
the Hypodrom-market or directly imported from other countries. The Hypodrom-market is
taken advantage of when one’s means are too small for traveling to a foreign land or when
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one’s web of contacts has not been sufficiently developed. But, buying in large quantities at
the Hypodrom-market is risky.
„It is absolutely necessary to check out the entire merchandise very carefully since
there are a lot of rejects there“ (Marat, 28, Kazakh).
Most of the petty-traders imported their merchandise by buying as much as they were
allowed to import duty-free (US$ 1400) at the so-called ‘shopping-tours’ which might be
trips by bus or train, air traffic, and/ or even partly ship-cruises. How much one buys
generally depends on how much one can carry and in addition on connections and the
shopping sites.
„You bring (e.g.) along a stock with merchandise and try to get situated at several
Tolchoki. If you hesitate even a little, the inflation gobbles up half of the profits.
Once it so happened that I utterly failed. That’s why I now really look into the
demand and only take the merchandise that is easiest to sell. Moreover I advise
others to pay attention to the sale points“ (Tatshenka, 36, Russian).
Generally, the petty-traders drive or fly one to four times a month, mainly to Turkey, China
or Poland, and in addition to Russia, the Arab Emirates, Syria and the Netherlands.
According to the labels on the goods, Germany, France and Italy are also included. But these
claims cannot easily be checked out because the—faked—labels of various firms can be
purchased in Tashkent by the meter.
For other petty-traders the Hypodrom-market, the wholesale market 15 km from Tashkent, is
the main place to trade and shop. In its vicinity there has very recently developed a
residential district for the resident traders who thus cut-down on their driving time. This is
next to the market-place itself another impact on the urban landscape. The profit margin is
correspondingly smaller when one then re-sells and was claimed to be between 10 and 50%
after deducting all expenses.
The motivation to go on a shopping tour at the wholesale market or in a foreign land is not
easy to understand. In addition to the risks and the need for capital for the trips, contacts and
experience are also very crucial. Still others get the merchandise through a family member
or acquaintance who lives abroad. Petty-traders who own a kiosk and sell groceries buy the
goods either from the ‘small wholesale traders’ or directly from the local producers (water,
beer, Uzbek Vodka). Those who deal in food stuff and yet have only one business rarely
import their goods, since they cannot compete with medium and large wholesale traders.
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Fatkhulla: He is about 35 years old, graduated from the poly-technical college in Tashkent
and then worked in a government- run firm. In1988 he entered into the co-operative where
he worked until 1991 as a machine tool setter. While working at the co-operative, he also
worked in the film industry, and travelling through the republics of the USSR bought film in
large quantities and rented them out. „Back then that yielded profit.“ After 1991 the movies
were not profitable anymore and he went into tourism. The tourism firm whose director he
became in 1992 was set up and organised by a firm that chiefly undertook the repairs of
loading machines and that his friend Nurgali ran. In 1993 the tourism business, too, stopped
turning a profit. To do something for only one year is not unusual, it shows the risk involved
and the durability of such engagment.
Nurgali: He, too, is about 35 and has a higher education. His business started with a trip to
Yugoslavia. There, furniture and cigarettes among other things were being traded. In 1986
he started a business for repairing loading machines. Today, he also is co-owner of a small
half-illegal sweets company. To have different sources of income is his personal strategy to
face more risky transitional times.
Their work at the market: They began in 1993 when the auto centre was on the ‘tolchok’
site. The got a container that they turned into a kiosk and began to deal cigarettes. Their
customers were car fanatics, who were visiting the auto center. From Yugoslavia ending
fighting all kind of cars and details were imported in addition to the very lucrative cigarette
business.
When the market was founded the director of the market, who belonged to their circle of
friends, suggested that they work at the ‘tolchok’. The have worked at the ‘tolchok’ since
October 1994. Their offerings were expanded into a cafe and salesbooths. When they began
the business in the city, there were few firms that sold groceries so that they had to search
for partners. Now, they themselves dictate the terms to the distributors because the majority
of the firms make their services available corresponding to their experience with the delivery
of the products. It is advantageous to work with regular distributors who, thanks to a long
acqaintanceship, grant credit or allow more time to pay for the goods. Now they own a cafe,
two stands next to the entrance of the market and seven tables on the market territory. With
their assortment of goods, they have a kind of monopoly status for drinks and snacks at the
market.
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They both thank the frictionless co-operation for their success. Their internal financial
relations are very close and there is a ‘common pot’:
„When one of us needs money he can take some at any time from the pot“ (Nurgali
with Fatkhulla nodding beside him).
The immediate sales of the merchandise takes place through realisators. People who are
hired receive a certain percentage of the net profits (5%); the losses are easily managed.
Acquaintances and relatives are recruited to be realisators. Their wives didn’t have any ties
to the business. One’s wife is only pulled in when there are financial problems but then with
reservation.
„I like my wife to be busy at home and not to work. I would like to run this business
without being concerned myself with all these details, but I cannot trust anyone else
to do this“ (Stephan, 35, Armenian).
My observations showed that when married couples are active together in a business, rolls
establish for each that correspond to the typically predominated roles for each in the Uzbek
society: The women are usually the realisators, the men the organisers and providers.
3.2 Realisators
The realisator is a salesperson who is concerned with the sales of goods for a single
business. He has no part in the ownership and as wages receives a commission on the
products sold. The concept ‘realisator’ does not exist in the customers’ vocabulary, but it is
often used by the salespersons themselves to establish their identity in their own, abeit
subordinate place in the system.
Svetlana is 60 years old and a doctor by profession. In 1994 she retired and started to work
at the market. Her sister was ‘tshelnok’ and needed a realisator for the merchandise she
brought from China. This sister rented a market stand and asked Svetlana to sell her goods.
She accepted but felt uncomfortable at first.
„In the beginning it was terribly strange: I never sold anything. It was terrible and
embarrassing. It down right humiliated me. I still feel it now. It is sickening that I
went to college and worked and now I am forced to do this. But since then I have
got used to it. Later I saw who ran the store next to me—namely two lawyers with
college education—and teachers and doctors. All were forced to earn money one
way or the other because without it one just cannot get along. And when my sister
doesn’t bring any merchandise, I sell that of other proprietors—namely of her
acquaintances“ (Svetlana, 60, Russian).
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Presently, Svetlana has no big plans for the ‘tolchok’. She does not intend to expand the
business since she is sure that it is only a temporary occupation.
Larissa is a woman, 35 years old, married and has three children. She was an employee in a
government-run operation and only received a small wage—and not even regularly at that.
A friend of her husband suggested that she would work as a realisator. She agreed. She was
pleased with the job but the merchandise (mainly women’s clothes) did not sell as the
proprietor did not pay any attention to the demand or the taste of the customers. With the
assent of the proprietor she started trading her own merchandise that she bought at the
Hypodrom-market. She realised that that was much more profitable that working for the
proprietor and being dependent on him. She wanted to buy her own spot and open her own
business.
„What do I want? I want to save some money and buy myself my own spot. I have
tried to work a little for my self. I bought T-shirts at the Hypodrom-market for US$
2 and sold them for US$ 3 dollars. That was profitable. I realised that I could earn
more this way. When you deal in merchandise that sells well and does not just lies
there, it works. But it depends on the owner which merchandise is bought“ (Larissa,
35, Ukrainian).
But the fee for retail space at the market keeps increasing, and my observations show that in
the meantime it has become extremely difficult without friends in the market administration
to get a spot at all. In addition there is the fact that whereas the relation between the market
and goods proprietors is fixed through documents concerning the sale or renting of the
space, the relations between the realisators and the goods proprietors are not formally
regulated. Two weeks prior to my departure the proprietor let her go and in her place his
wife sold the merchandise since, as he sees it, she does not cost anything. Larissa
independently searched for a new job as a realisator, tried to work for another proprietor
who sold at the next stand over but was not taken.
Katharina and Timur are a pair in retirement. They began with shopping-tours together with
Fatkhulla; they bought and sold. They have been at the market since the opening. They came
to it through an earlier acquaintanceship. They deal in toilet seats, ironing boards, bathroom
mats, etc. They have their own special niche. This strategy of specialisation they describe as
their recipe to success.
They buy the merchandise either at the wholesale market Hypodrom in Tashkent or from
familiar proprietors. They had worked together even before this. In the beginning they were
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afraid of every business due to its negative image that this activity and its practice had where
they lived.
„My husband didn’t get very far. He made an impression as if he had nothing to do
with it. I didn’t like it that much, either, where we had never done anything like it
before. I inspected merchandise in a store and he was a head engineer in a factory.
In the beginning I was very scared that something would get stolen and tied down
all the merchandise but now I’ve got used to it. Supposedly something was stolen
from a lady and she pressed charges but never thought she would ever get
something back, but she got it all back“ (Katharina, 67, Russian).
The examples show that this low income activity is done predominantly by women.
Analysing the empirical evidence it is needed to refer to articles tackling more or less
intensive the economic restructuring and the feminisation of labour (Standing 1989; Hezyer
1989; Humphrey 1987). In these studies the rationality of the employers (here: the
proprietors) and the ways in which women’s so defined weaknesses like for example their
age or educational background is taken advantage of by employers to hold costs down or
increase productivity is predominant. It is argued for example that the causes for women’s
powerlessness or lack of opportunities does not lie in the pattern of transition but in the
weakness of the women outside the workplaces. Women are squeezed out of production and
other public settings in Uzbekistan (Haizova/ Abdurakhmanov 1996). In the feminist
literature it is argued when women work they are confined to low prestige sectors or to
occupational segments mainly dominated by women. These sectors can be characterised by
low wages, no security and long working hours.
3.3 Typical carrier path of and market actors in their context
Those who work as realisators face the alternatives of either entering into a more risky
venture or else remaining without work and subsistence. Becoming a realisator also gives
one the chance, with time, to become a proprietor oneself with the money one has earned.
Or buying at the so-called ‘shopping-tours’ or at the wholesale markets for first-time-traders
often results in a career as a petty-trader, too. On these organised bus tours and flights
people purchase and usually sell at the markets in Tashkent. The starting capital, at this point
non-existent, is pulled together from relatives and acquaintances—loaned interest free. Now
there are, according to the market director of the Sozgorod-market, private banks and
loaning institutions from which money can be borrowed on interest. Profits are re-invested,
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the net profit and the quantity of merchandise purchased increasing with success.
The next step is the attempt to become independent of the ‘shopping-tour-organisers’ by
acquiring a vehicle or by managing one’s own transport, e.g. one’s own flights. Profits don’t
have to be shared with someone else. Then, one’s own (exclusive) business contacts and
routes can be established and business can expand. Eventually, even realisators will be
hired. However, ethnic categories do not play a large role in the recruiting of personnel.
In the next phase the personal transport of the merchandise is less and less necessary. The
business partners have developed stabile business relationships. Transport is organised and
communication is achieved by telephone and fax. The fourth step, as Fatkhulla describes it,
is to become a wholesaler who does not sell at the markets anymore but rather functions as a
purchaser and reseller maintaining the business and storage premises. These wholesalers
function as middlemen and are registered as importers. The deals are handled with modern
means of processing by employees. The structure of distribution shifts to the centre since
larger quantities must find buyers in a relatively short time. As already the studies of
Menkhoff (1993, 1994) on ethnic Chinese in Singapore showed most businesses are going
through a rationalisation process which makes Menkhoff to conclude that the traditional
kinship ties and trust relations in business are receding. Implicit in the operational directive
of every small-scale business is the objective to expand. The expansion motive is based not
only on profit gains or financial accumulation but also on the desire to avoid insolvency or
bankruptcy and on more psychological and emotional factors of success and security (Evers/
Mehmet 1994).
Nevertheless, the Uzbek case together with other so-called ‘transitional economies’ are
unique in regard to the size of the state apparatus and its dominance in societal
transformation, which will be tackled in more detail in the following chapter. On a case
level, thus, some could use the structure of distribution of government operations, which still
exists, right from the beginning. Fatkhulla explains:
„Functionaries and operations managers had and still have a head start in
information—due to their proximity to the bureaucracy. There are many ex-
functionaries among the new proprietors and now drive Mercedes since they used
their business contacts and know-how“ (Fatkhulla, 35, Uzbek).
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In this my results coincide with those of Nee (1989, 1992, 1996) in the example of China’s
elaborate ‘power persistence hypothesis’ that says that especially those belonging to the
cadre can preserve their position and power in the transition phase.
The political-administrative system regulates the market and that the elite decide. Again and
again petty-traders and consumers emphasised determinacy in their definition of ‘tolchok’.
In ordinary language nowadays, the concept ‘New Russians’ (the concept ‘New Uzbeks’ is
hardly ever used), the ‘New Rich’, is applied to those who have quickly come into money
and/ or are in possession of their status through western objects of prestige (for example,
western cars, a large apartment or house, buying in real/ genuine stores, etc.). This new class
is predominantly assigned by the Tashkentians to the mafia milieu20—for better or for
worse. My landlady said:
„Everything was already like this once, in the 20s, at the time of the New Economic
Politics (Lenin, MK) -- then there were new-rich, speculators, dollars and market
economy, too.“
Again and again I was told that he who owns a new cafe or sells goods in a kiosk has
contacts to the mafia and pays them protection money.
The above described typical steps in a petty-trader’s career applies, according to my
findings, to individual petty-traders and for petty-trader groups who have joined together to
form a single business. Some of these networks came about through their travelling together
on shopping-tours. Most petty-traders agreed that they co-ordinated their trips with other
petty-trader friends in order to be able to help one another in a foreign land, transporting,
etc. Though this groups have no permanent membership or common budget. The strengthening
of weak ties in foreign lands, that is to say in this case their activation in Turkey, seems to
follow the explanatory pattern that with larger ethnic distance, internal connections are
stabilised which seems to be less necessary at the other end of the business, i.e. in one’s own
country. (cf. Wallace 1997:14; Evers/ Schrader 1994). Through information sharing,
financing, and, generally, providing social support, the petty-traders have facilitated the
establishment of the routes of trade.
                                               
20 According to Grathoff (1982) aspects of the accessibility of the setting for outsiders and the possibility of a
penetration into the setting, the participation or inclusion, trust and co-dependency should be analysed in
socio-graphic writing of any milieu. Difficulties of researching the mafia milieu are very obvious.
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Thus, the idea occurred to four petty-traders who already knew each other a few years not to
calculate and sell individually any more but to run the business together and share the risk:
„We get up a common pool to which we all, in the beginning, contributed our
varying starting capitals. Every one of us just put in what he had. Until we earned
back this starting Sum, each received a Sum relative to his contribution to the pool.
But after that everything was divided by four.“
They describe their friendship in a group interview unanimously as ‘communism.’ They
never argued; before they were just friends and now the business side has just added to that
friendship.
„Of course our conversations have changed because of this. We don’t talk about
politics anymore, we talk about business. But that has a lot to do with the times“
(Sasha, 40, Ukrainian).
They characterise modern times unanimously as marked by the acquisition of living and by
the fight for survival. Old ideas, the old training, old intuitions have all become obsolete.
In the beginning this common pool was used to finance their travel, the booth fees and the
purchase of grocery-kiosks. Since then, a basis has accumulated for emergencies that makes
it possible to help each other out in times of illness, family celebrations and other financial
problems like getting a place to live.
„Usually you urgently need money right when you can’t earn any“ (Eldar, 29,
Uzbek).
The mutual trust was unanimously described in separate interviews as being very high. That
is how they achieved a minimisation of risk that they are very happy about—that gives the
friendship extra meaning.
„Personal risk and economic risk, today, are very closely related. Before we had our
work, our financial security and money played a smaller role“ (Fatkhulla, 35,
Uzbek).
A further strategy they used to minimise risk consists in shifting the main business to selling
beverages, provisions and cigarettes that they either bought from wholesale traders (melki
optovi) or directly from a Uzbek manufacturer. The sale of locally-available goods allowed
for a faster turnover of merchandise and a more secure, albeit smaller, profit margin. The
clothing kiosks were only run on the side since they obviously had put less stake on
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products in less demand. Over the course of time they achieved a division of labour that
made the business run more effectively.
A still further strategy is to expand the network through outside contacts. A net of private
and public contacts was built. Eldar has the taxes imposed and the accounts balanced
through contacts he already established earlier. Realisators and salespersons are looked for
in one’s circle of friends and acquaintances, found and then contractually bound. Some of
these are only verbal agreements. Payment mostly comes on a provisional basis. They make
hiring decisions together and the continuous presence of at least one of them allows for
continual personal control. But since a high net profit is also in the interests of the
realisators, this control is only necessary in the beginning phase of a new employee’s
career. Further, one member of the group, Marat, functions for the market proprietor as
acting manager which holds the competition at the market in check. Market director Marat
sustains the security reciprocally, so that he could, at any time, go back to his role as a petty-
trader together with the others in the business, if he, for example, were to be let go as the
director. This arrangement would take place, although he has no experience, since he has
never sold anything. In such a case he would not have to bring in any capital. He
emphasised that moral principles are intact in local communities in Uzbekistan—only the
state and its organs are unpredictable and arbitrary. With a part of the profits, those running
the markets also fulfill charitable goals. He explained that:
„Morality is a part of the politics of the market operators. Our president (of the
market) is a very good man. He can’t stop helping poor people. Last year they gave
money for shoes for blind children, supported the victims of war and veterans,
helped finance the construction of a church and gave to the red cross, although they
still had to pay tax on this money. The state really should have been taking care of
this things, but it doesn’t“ (Marat, 42, Tatar).
Precisely the interplay of the negative picture of trade as speculation in Soviet times and the
present necessity to earn money by trading allows a discourse of justification to come about
and leads to a special emphasis on moral values and achievements. Thus, even by the market
administration a special value was placed on giving money out for all kind of charities
(Karpenko/ Kaiser 1996). In addition, the security of the market place was named in order to
disarm the scepticism of the Tashkentians with respect to the ‘tolchok’. For this reason the
site was fenced in, watched over by watch towers, and a security troop also patrols the area.
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It can further be confirmed that after experiencing the market and the mutual trust involved
in it, the purely negative notion of market and trade turns into a positive one. The criticism
of government actors remains in keeping with tradition. They are responsible for the
deterioration of the socio-economic situation and represent the main threat to the petty-
traders.
„Maybe tomorrow they will forbid us to breath. We live in such a country“ (Marat,
42, Tatar).
The intellectuals’ discourse around the kitchen table criticising the government shifted to the
market place and into a socio-economic discourse. A new social setting has emerged.
To conclude, the petty-traders are a new social group that came to be as a result of the
transformation, and of these, the ones who engage in distant trade were often already mobile
earlier through work, their training or the military or could make use of any social
positioning or capital. Having information at one’s disposal which allows one to help oneself
to a net of ‘good turns’—i.e. corruption—and to avoid conflicts with the responsible
authorities is qua factor of success especially important for any ‘new economic actor’. The
actors who act within such a net of relationships and out of whom the net itself is actually
comprised have a special relationship to one another. Individuals take part in reciprocal
actions or relationships of exchange through these networks that can consequently increase
the variation of the transition and acquisition of new information, and this information is
indispensable if everything is to function successfully under unstable conditions. Both
analytical approaches and case studies show that trust and security form the „raison d’être“
of reciprocity (Eckert 1996). Moreover, attention must be paid to the fact that norms, rules
of acquisition, accumulation and use of network capital are embedded in cultural conditions.
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4. Integration into the Societal System - Embeddedness
Long (1992) describes ‘social interface’ as critical points where various social systems
connect or intersect, and levels or settings of the social order in which discontinuities come
about as a result of varying normative values or social interests. According to Long, in these
intersections it can be seen how the actors’—who are influenced by institutional
considerations and power relations that lie outside of the concrete situation—perceptions,
interests and goals change through interaction, and how they also, on the other hand, are
determined through the behaviour of the actors. The intersections show the structure and
explain the dynamics (vide Lachenmann 1995:24-28).
Economic institutions are shaping the lives of individuals differently at an interactional level
firms, offices, markets and households are not only sites of economic activities but
simultaneously of the display and production of any societal marker (among them gender,
ethnicity, tribe etc.) as a routine accomplished of everyday life therefore it is not something
that ‘is’ but is ‘done’. At an institutional level, economic actors, relationships, and processes
shape and are shaped by categories of inclusion and exclusion.
4.1 Societal Embeddedness of Social Action
The use of illegal practices forced and forces the petty-traders and the manufacturers to turn
to ‘their own people’ for help and support. Ethnic economy researchers stress ‘ethnic
resources’ as the source of ethnic groups’ entrepreneurial capacity. Ethnic resources are
defined as the social and cultural features within an ethnic group which an ethnically based
trading network utilises in doing business. In order to particularise the ethnic resources, the
focus of theorising empirical data resulted in a delineation and categorisation of groups (on
the basis of national, regional and ethnic origin) into high, marginal and low disposition to
ethnic entrepreneurship.21
Strict division into family clans was not preserved anywhere but with the old system of
equal distribution of common welfare and the transition of the society towards a free market
                                               
21 Thus, for instance, high ethnic entrepreneurship groups have included Arabs, Armenians, Chinese,
Gypsies, Greeks, Italians, Japanese, Jews, Indians and Pakistanis, Lebanese, Koreans and Persians. Others
have displayed medium or low disposition towards entrepreneurship and trading especially.
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system the differences have started to outline again. Some of the family groups are now
setting up joined farm holds, the social and economic differences between the family groups
are now more obvious. In this regard it was mentioned only by Aytmanbetov in Nukus that
their is clan disposition:
„Araby clan is the most successful in commerce. They are buying grown up and
yield and buy their own transport delivered to the market in Russia. They are
bringing back industrial goods“ (Aytmanbetov, Karakalpak).
He explained his village society being based on family relations.
„There are 10-15 family groups in our makhallah which are established on the
relation to the family principals (casts). For example: Lashinchilar (that is translated
as carrot growers), Araby, Malajy (servants), Korallar (blacks), Shaitonlar (devils),
Ashaklar (asses), Bookchilar (excrement cleaners), Koojokchilar (burned). The
biggest clan is Araby (Arabs).“22
In urban areas are very few such clans and as a rule they are not involved in business
activity. In Karakalpakstan, if we would judge on the respondent’s statements there are also
not many relative groups united on base of common business interests. Karmisheeva (1979)
has already pointed out implicitly in her paper on commerce at the start of the 20th Century
that the specialisation in the economy does not necessarily follow ethnic but at best local and
regional (geographical) borders, but in doing so developed parallel to the borders of clans
and tribes. Since back then one as a producer (e.g.) of grapes or rice within a certain region
was always identified with a particular settlement, the economic specialisation of production
also reproduced the differences between various clans or ethnic groups. An increase in
mobilisation, like it sounds in Deutsch (1955, 1961, 1963) does not therefore, taken by
itself, imply heavier integration since a reinforcement of ethnic difference goes along with
economic specialisation and the corresponding expanding commerce. However, a formal
structure is being set up in the commercial activities which are increasing again by resorting
to embedded resources. (cf. Amponsem 1996).
Based on the empirical data collected in Uzbekistan the traders as new economic actors,
their experiences and interactions will be scrutinised to illustrate the dimensions underlying
the ongoing economic transformations and to understand this dynamics from a societal
                                               
22 Dr. Fatkhullah R. Ergashev, Dean of the Faculty of History at the Academy of State and Social
Construction Under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, refers to those groups as occupational casts
(own interview).
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perspective. The differences of the interaction approach only succeed to delineate ethnic
based networks from non-ethnic ones by emphasising the extent of embededdness and the
relative use of cultural and social capital.
The researched networks referred to ‘their own people’ often as friends and relatives.
Acquaintanceship, Friendship and kinship all make the question of whether the business
relationship is a formal bond superfluous and impede the development of (e.g.) conflicts.
„Trust can be placed in kin-relations“ (Stephan, 35, Armenian).
Networking comes from co-operative working relations.
„How individuals are linked to one another and how the bond of affiliation serve
both as lubricant for getting things done and as glue which provide order and
meaning to social life“ (Powell/ Smith-Doerr 1994:365).
At the level of interaction between people, social networks are defined as
„a specific set of relations among a defined set of persons with the additional
property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to
interpret the social behaviour of the individuals involved“ (Mitchell 1969:2).
Network analytical approaches show that the structure or pattern of social relations demand
or (de)limit the actions of the persons involved in a number of ways. Thus, network analysis
offers a starting point for understanding how social structures influence individual
behaviour. The empirically derived concept ‘network capital’ encompasses the potential and
the use of all types of nets with any objective and on the basis of any principles
whatsoever.23 Thus, this concept includes both long-term blood-/ primordial relations and
friendships but also short-term, instrumental acquaintanceships, goal-oriented patron-client
relationships, etc. (cf. Czako/ Sik 1993). In this I am assuming that there coexist more
embedded and more disembedded areas in every society—in traditional as well as in modern
ones.24 Social capital as investment has been activated by the new economic actors during
the process of transformation.
                                               
23 Bourdieu (1982) brings up social capital in contradistinction to cultural capital and gives the example of
networks for social capital. The concept network capital is found in its literal translation of Russian sociology.
Also used in Czako and Sik (1993).
24 What I have in mind here are the concepts of varying velocities of globalisation and localisation in varying
social settings. For the concept of embeddedness readers are referred to Polanyi (1978) and Granovetter
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„The basic assumptions with regard to the behaviour of the actors (are) ... bounded
rationality, opportunism and network-based strategies“ (Sik 1994:48).
Granting the embeddedness of actions and interactions, the current theories of
transformation (cf. Nee 1989, 1992, 1996) must be verified, whereby one must inquire both
into the restrictions and into the advantages of collective action for the group or, as the case
may be, for certain persons. In this context Evers (1997b:17) points to the possible
connections between the theory of transformation and the theory of strategic groups.
In the horizontal dimension petty-traders established their nets of connections within various
localities, in the vertical dimension relationships and connections to authorities like the
market administration, tax administration, the militia, customs, the mafia, etc. were
maintained.
More systematically one can depict different ways of risk reduction. The more frequently
used mechanisms like social networks and patron-client relationships can - according to
Wallace (1997) - be divided in symmetric and asymmetric ones. The former referring e.g. to
reciprocal ties, weak ties in the terms of Granovetter, which were made more reliable
through friendship and kinship relations. Under asymmetric ties she subsumed patron-client
relationships, buttressed by ties of loyalty and gifts, which offered more predictable
relationships than random bribing. While patron-client relationships were said to be
vertically structured, we can discern a more horizontal, but nevertheless asymmetric
relationship, when people try to utilise former relationships (Meyer-Tran/ Kaiser 1997).
symmetric asymmetric
vertical patron-client relationships
horizontal reciprocal ties, ethnic groups utilise former relationships
The relationships that were revealed in the process basically cover two areas: On the one
hand dependencies should be noted (material, legal, those due to power) and on the other
hand the investigation of the network even offers the possibility of a cartography of the
development of the discourse on the concept of the market or simply the spread of
                                                                                                                                                    
(1985), although I think the historical sequence of embeddedness, disembeddedness, re-embeddedness of a
society is an over-interpretation.
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information. The distribution of information and interpretations of the situation follow the
course determined by the networks.
Thus, a militia soldier can work together with a colleague in a neighbouring area but also
with the mafia of the bazaar and the private organisers he had been observing. Since the
access to merchandise is monopolised in certain areas, networking exceeds all provisional
structures. There is still the legal form of access to basic goods, but it does not appear to
ensure the maintenance of one’s standard of living, let alone its improvement.
The co-operation between the mafia and the governmental administration became apparent
in Tashkent through the recent construction of a bazaar on the south-east edge of the city
which was finished in the record time of three weeks, when the previously unavailable
materials were supplied by ‘private businessmen’. This supposedly was the result of the
administration’s promise to ignore the allocation of the licenses or „rights to put up a shop“
(Erdal, 35, Uzbek) at this bazaar and as a result of the threat of arresting mafia-bosses.
In such networks the regimentation of relationships is a natural one and characterises these
networks even outside of the market. It is a familiar regimentation. It would be possible to
establish a web of clients exclusively within a group at the everyday level. Precisely the
representation of ethnic groups in most jobs and businesses—at least in the area of
Tashkent—would make this option possible. In the ethnically mixed urban context webs of
clients include people of various ethnic affiliations and appear to be increasingly determined
by business contracts. Networks, especially those of petty-traders, appear to function supra-
ethnically.
One of the main dispositions to business is accessibility to financial capital. It also becomes
apparent in the recruiting of initial capital for that a web of personal relations is important.
However, the obtained data didn’t show significant differences between ethnic groups.
Though in an urban setting to rely on ones own saving was higher. In Tashkent with 44%
the highest value was achieved which can partly be explained by a higher amount of savings
in cities. Matching this in an rural context the percentage of borrowing went up to 36% at
the highest. In contrary went down in Tashkent to a low of 21%.25
                                               
25 All other variations are not very significant. Though taking credit at interest varied from 2,5% to 8,5% and
credit from banks varied from 9% to 11,5%. This data was obtained through an all Uzbekistan survey with
5.000 respondents with representative quotas for ‘nationality’, ‘age’, ‘region’ and ‘sex’ administered by
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The need for credit (for purchasing goods, a place at the market, etc.) is satisfied without
bringing in banks due to the inefficiency of the regulations on depositing security. Help and
credits are given to friends, independently of their place of residence. On this there were a few
indications that a system of self-sufficiency, similar to a co-operative, had developed at the
‘tolchok’. The money is borrowed from acquaintances but these are, in this case, no longer
friends or relatives but neighbouring petty-traders at the market. One informant reported a
case where neighbouring traders went to see a notary and one handed out the amount of
1400 US$ to the other, but it was signed and attested to give back 1550 US$. The interest
gets included this way, although taking it is illegal.26
In the Soviet community, friendship is an important form of collaboration which is based on
a large amount of trust and surpasses the barriers of rational considerations.
                                                                                                                                                    
TADQIQOT, Tashkent. However, data processing is not yet finished and the results have to be worked out
and compared with additional surveys in Tashkent and Buchara asking only petty-traders administered by
TADQIQOT, too (see Kaiser 1997a, on research agencies refer to Kaiser 1997b, c).
26 (Indirect) interest rates on foreign currencies varied between 30-40% per annum. Others said that 1% per
day is not to bad. A bakers wife said: „It’s too high for us to use. It’s profitable only for those who just buying
and selling. In case we would get it wouldn’t pay back. All the profit would go to pay back the credit“ (Leila,
26 Kazakh).
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„A friend is someone who always understands you, forgives you, when you find
yourself in a difficult situation. It is someone of whom I can be sure he won’t cheat
me“ (Stephan, 35, Armenian).
This kind of person is the preferred type of business partner, because friends are not only
bound by a common past but also by a moral obligations that mirrors the limits of what is
allowed under the conditions of an absent legal environment.
„You don’t let friends down“ (Fatkhulla, 35, Uzbek).
Friendships in business are, however, rather seldom. They are supplement through
relationships with relatives or acquaintances that are ‘tried and true’, i.e. where trust exists
from experience. Often it is the cases that trade secrets form the borders of friendship.
„I did not go with these friends since something very interesting happened back
then, namely that no one was prepared to reveal his channel of information, his
income, or even what merchandise he wanted to take. It is very important to know
what sells and what doesn’t, where there is demand and where there’s none.
„I: Those were their close friends and they nevertheless didn’t give them any
information whatsoever?
R: Some were very close friends, but still didn’t reveal this information. Moreover,
a close friend, as I later learned—probably a year later, sold me an invitation—or
more precisely, he sold it to me through a middleman. I later told him that to his
face, but it was much later when it finally came to that“ (Nosirow, 36, Tatar).
Having close personal contacts to neighbours and members of the market administration
make formal guarantees in the form of signatures on paper or long-term obligations
superfluous. The individual petty-trader is, first, wrapped up in a close-meshed net of social
control and, second, well-informed about the businesses of his neighbours.
In the production of business connections, recommendations tried and true partners receive
an important meaning as an important factor of trust. When a partner cheats it is not just he
who falls out of the net, all those he recommended fall out, too.
Thus, the sense and necessity of ‘petty-trader-collectives’ lies in the minimisation and
avoidance of social risks. The half-legal character of the practices investigated, the
instability of the situation, the demand for economic networks, for financial backing, etc.
became the basis of specific forms of solidarity that are able to decrease risk. Friendship,
kinship, and long-term intimacy are basic categories for the description of social networks
and the basis of trust.
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During one of my interviews someone came to my interlocutor Nasarov and said that he
absolutely had to speak to him. My interlocutor asked him to wait. After about 15 minutes
the man came back and said that it was urgent. Nasarov did not care to discuss the matter in
my presence, so they stepped aside and then disappeared to the market. Later I asked
Nasarov what happened. He explained to me that Hai’rhulla asked him for help in getting a
trading-spot at the market and that he is acquainted with the market director. He can make
decisions in this matter without worrying about the formalities and restrictions that those
people have to endure who are not integrated into this network of friendships. People like
my respondent are ‘necessary’; knowing them makes possible a more effective
materialisation of activity at the market. Nasarov obviously has resources at his disposal that
are to be used. That shows the continued existence of conventional models of behaviour
from times when every question was settled ‘on the sly’.
„In the USSR you could regulate everything through friendships. I do something for
someone, and when I need something, I get help. But now that just isn’t possible
anymore. Before, the people were even insulted if you began to talk about money.
Now, it’s the complete opposite. If you don’t pay, it may happen that the next time
you won’t make it, you won’t get what you want...
Since then more and more people take money. When one is in a difficult situation,
one has to get connections—but one still has to pay—it’s just a question of time. I
have some rather far reaching connections at my disposal. Sometimes friends turn
to me and I can make some suggestions, tell them who they have to turn to and
how. We talk about the price later. In Tashkent there are fixed prices, e.g. for a
passport within three weeks US$ 150, otherwise it takes two months. But if you
come with a good recommendation, there is no talk of money, a gift will do. But in
general it is the case that the longer the acquaintanceship, the smaller the fee“
(Stephan, 35, Armenian).
When pre-existing relationships are absent, it may take time to cultivate new linkages and
this will often involve exchanging material/ informational gifts, taking potential partners out
for dinner and/ or vodka, inviting them to ceremonial banquets/ meetings, and making
donations to the community (makhallah) (c. Yang 89 and 1994). These practices are often
symbolised as gestures/ signs of friendship , loyalty, mutual trust and ‘giving face’ (a code
that communicates a sense of social importance in the network). It is through the active
exchange of these gifts/ favours that boundaries and significance are given to networks.
Risk reduction and capital building have to be analysed as modes of appropriation. On the
horizontal level a personal mode of appropriation was described within the web of market
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actors, relations of friendship and personal interaction. The functional relations in the
vertical level enlarge the organisational structure applying a corporate mode of appropriation
including alliances, patronage and networks.27
4.2 Transformed modes of action: strategic networks
The very gradual path towards a market based economy is meant to avoid social risks and
political instability in Uzbekistan. The authoritarian monopolisation of resources oppresses
the raise of a counter elite and of political entrepreneurs with particularist interests. Private
initiatives are overwhelmed by contradictory laws and decrees, exorbitant taxes, and
government interference. The size of the free market economy has actually declined after the
new legislation. The bazaars have grown more quiet and pale.
The state and especially its executing organs have changed very little in the perception of the
petty-traders who operate without him. In Soviet times being a trader or running a market
was illegal and was not done publicly. Today, the ‘tolchok’ culture is formally legalised, and
there are documents that regulate this activity, commissions that determine one’s compliance
with trade regulations. Many are forced to turn to illegal or half-legal methods. In various
ways petty-traders make the necessity of having to use illegal practices clear:
„R: Most problematic are the taxes. Up to 90% of the profit must be used for taxes.
With such a distribution there is no use in doing business.
I: But you don’t just let that happen, do you?
R: No, I don’t report my earnings.
I: And what happens if the tax office finds out?
R: How? I keep practically no books. I buy the merchandise and the cloak of some
company. I bring it here, sell it and that’s all.
I: What about the documents for the shipping?
                                               
27 Downscaling strategies of groups Evers (1980, 1988) proposed three modes of appropriation to derive a
revenue or interests through: (1) personal mode of appropriation, meaning formation of professional or job-
specific organisations such as: chambers of commerce, professional associations etc. deriving a revenue
through ‘personal appropriation’, (2). corporate mode of appropriation maintaining or extending ownership
and control over the means of production by enlarging the organisational structure through ‘corporative
appropriation’ such as networks, alliances, and patronage (3). collective mode of appropriation meaning the
receipt of revenue through a public appropriation, i.e. the government bureaucracy or the military to establish
their organisations to become the major representative of the state power.
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R: You can buy those. After the deal I burn them. The tax office won’t bother with
little fish like me—that costs more than it’s worth.
I: Does that mean that all business people are not in good standing with the law?
R: 99% of them, for certain. You can’t observe the laws, if you do they will take the
shirt off your back. If I were to report all my income, I would have to sell the
merchandise for twice as much, and people wouldn’t pay that much. But
with my system, both the buy and the seller make a profit“ (Tatshenka, 42,
Tatar).
„I always have a bad feeling when I drive by the prison; somehow I feel strange.
You surely understand that all this is only half-legal. If they really want to they can
lock you up for it. The money is lost in the process, but that’s not the worst. But one
can also end up there. Yeah, if you really think about it, we could all be sent there.
In the next due campaign we could all find each other there“ (Fatkhulla, 35,
Uzbek).
The ‘tolchok’ is a place where the petty-traders see themselves as being exposed to a great
danger. I could observe how notification within the market worked when a committee was
approaching. Proprietors hectically informed their realisators, others informed their
acquaintances. There was a nervous bustle, and trading for US dollars was suspended since
it is illegal and brings with it a penalty and the confiscation of one’s merchandise as
consequences.
Clashing with the organs of the state is a big risk. In order to protect themselves from these
undesired consequences issued by the state, the petty-traders build friendships with other
business people, with the militia and individuals within the machinery of power „which
increases the businessman’s strength (Stephan, 35, Armenian)“. It seems likely that the
connections that the interlocutors often described as methods of friendship work well with
authorities in the most various areas. Especially at times when the legislation changes so fast
that no one can be sure what is legal and what is not, and this leads to a further decline in the
credibility and predictability of the state. The high level of state control in Uzebkistan was
made explicit by the interviewed traders and makes it necessary to look at the interface
between state and ‘new economic actors’ more systematically. There are observable
differences in the trading regimes, the social and cultural consequences according to be
entrepreneurial active in states with a different level of control. Therefor, the following
model on the interplay between the level of societal control and the level of social
embeddedness and the resulting trade regimes is proposed:
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Social Embeddedness
high low
Level of Control high
strategic networking/
corporative
appropriation
(ex. Mafia)
state controlled,
contractually organised
trade
low Trader’s Dilemma cheating, chaos
The strategic networks are established through functional and personal relationships and
their interface with the strong state was described several times by traders the following
way:
„The mafia is the state“ or „The state is the mafia“.
The strategic networks traders are embedded in have means to appropriate and maintain as
long as it is necessary their own interest by gaining privileges, access to social resources,
and to a certain extend other abstract objectives such as power and prestige. Their main
function is to keep their business going and to reduce their risk through modes of
reassurance of the status quo or any improvement on it. The way of surplus extraction are
‘modes of appropriation’.28
The functional relationships that are distinct from friendships include the quick issuing of a
passport, connections to the market director, contacts to the border patrol, the passing on of
information about a coming control commission, etc. In the petty-traders language, the
functional relationships are distinguished from friendships through the use of linguistic
                                               
28 Evers (1980, 1988) refers to strategic groups analysing Southeast Asian societies. In his strategic group
theory whichever group emerges first and gains political power has the greatest chance to structure the
political system and to establish a pattern of legitimacy. The strategic group theory was developed by drawing
from both Marxist and Weberian sociological theories in order to understand more adequately the different
transition of Southeast Asian societies. However, due to the very low degree of a collective mode of
appropriation, political participation and the orientation of the new economic actors towards the duration of
their business activity in maintaining their relations it is referred to strategic networks. The strategic group
theory deals in addition to business networks with the government bureaucracy or the military which receive
public revenue and establish their organisations to become the major representative of state power.
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equivalents for acquaintances and friends in the Russian language. Functional relationships
need no personal contact and can be mediated in groups of three. The distance of the
petitioner influences here, in addition to the possibility of reciprocation, the price or the kind
of favour. For intermediaries in the economic sector, there is now the English concept
‘broker’ which has been adopted into the Russian language. The behaviour of petty-traders
changes the social reality, and the social progress changes their behaviour.
On the local level these processes promote changes and execute strategies. Functional
relationships occur between the private and public. Such private-public networks include
government officials and the traders they control (who must register, pay taxes and duties).
On the level of privatised state companies Nee termed them ‘cadre enterpreneurs’ (1992:1-
27). In 1994 in Buchara a former party-official had turned completely private. He was not
only active in animal husbandry, but also owned a shop where imported foreign goods were
sold. Interlocutors said somewhat maliciously that he turned into a real bay, the title of the
rich people before the Soviet Revolution. Such ‘cadre entrepreneurs’ or ‘strategic networks’
in the case of self-established trading business promote the intertwining of private-public
interests as well as central-local domains and, for the most part, have good connections to
higher state hierarchies. (vide Kaiser 1997a).
These settings and changes have led to the strong presence of a strategic network based on a
set of new public actors at central, regional, and local levels. Research of ‘Centre Expert’ on
crediting and production found similar ‘clientelistic’ patterns of negotiations between quasi-
public actors and enterprises.
„This network of private-public forces, especially those in cross-border activities,
are structurally privileged by the present system and gain from the decentralisation
processes and strategies in various ways“ (Alisher Il’Khamov, Director Centre
EXPERT, own interview).
Capitalising on these new capacities/ opportunities traders have been drawing on their
linguistic affinities and kinship ties. They have begun to build socio-economic connections
connecting major trading spots.
46
Conclusions
The investigation of the Uzbek petty-traders in the process of transformation shows that
trade in Uzbekistan is embedded in informal networks and socio-cultural relationships which
for their part underlie a fundamental change. This change takes place in the context of socio-
economic processes of change. It has become clear from the presentation of the dynamic
conceptions and approaches of the petty-traders investigated that they are not only ‘victims’
of change but also instigators of economic transformation.
The Uzbek ‘tolchok’ represents a model of the appropriation of market economic
mechanisms at the level of every day practice, of the way in which people familiarise
themselves with it, and of how the transformation takes place, concretely and in the minds of
the actors. ‘Tolchok’ can only be understood as a social setting, built up by the petty-traders’
dynamic conceptions with respect to their economy, as a setting for the exchange of cultural
values for the creation of new patterns of behaviour, the realisation of new social practices
and for bringing about a specific lifestyle and identification.
The sense and necessity, from ‘petty-traders’ networks’ to ‘strategic networks’ lie in the
avoidance and minimisation of social risks. The half-legal character of the practices
investigated becomes the basis for specific forms of solidarity that are able to reduce the risk
and maintain corporative appropriation. Friendship, kinship, and long-term acquaintanceship
are the three basic categories for the description of social networks and are the basis of trust.
Here, the pattern of relations in the networks, (e.g.) friendship, kinship, intimacy, etc., is
used as a resource through which the type of group activity is determined. Rather than
operating along a specific ethnic inclination, personal networks, ties and social relations are
created to facilitate resource mobilisation, modes of organisation and appropriation.
Strategic action forms trading.
The petty-trader’s employment of categories and conception from Soviet times to describe
their new practices mirrors the new ununiform shaping of a positive identification among the
actors, the aspiration to justify their present practices and the definition of one’s own relation
to the market over the past.
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